TLO Land Based Conflict Report, the case of Paktia

The report was released in December 2008 by TLO for INEF.

The objective of this study was to produce an analysis of the scope and dynamics of land based conflicts in Afghanistan with a special focus on conflicts in Paktia Province located in the Southeast of Afghanistan.

Scarce resources, the weak Afghan state, social norms, population movements and the presence of different social groups were identified as the structural factors of land based conflicts in Afghanistan. These structural factors, considered necessary but not sufficient causes of conflict, were exacerbated by a set of different factors making up the conflict dynamics (e.g., the legacy of war and frequent regime changes). The most important conflict dynamics identified for Paktia relate to the history of land policies, state presence/ outreach and local power struggles.

Local power struggles mainly include land grabbing by actors with access to means of force/violence or strongmen with connections to people in positions of (political) power. The actors involved in land grabbing are diverse and not limited only to former mujahideen commanders but also include tribes or communities taking advantage of the weakness of the state to (re-) appropriate government land. As the Afghan state has not fully been rebuild, and the reach of the central government outside Kabul is weak, different actors currently seize the opportunity presented by the absence of strong, efficient and impartial bureaucratic structures in order to grab land to their own benefit.

Issues of political power, economics and migration are often inter-connected. War and forced displacement has created a situation where returning populations found their land occupied by a neighbouring tribe. Land that was of little value during the war has regained importance since the fall of the Taliban. Some of the conflict actors have important constituencies still living in Pakistan. Many claims or reclaims of land are based on the expectation of the return of these populations in the future, and the subsequent distribution or sale of land to them. Furthermore, frequent regime changes over the last decades, each implementing different land policies and/or reforms has created a situation where government departments are engaged in conflicts with tribes over the appropriation or re-appropriation of land.

Since the fall of the Taliban regime the number of conflicts has also augmented due to the increasing land prices. In Paktia this especially concerns the provincial centre Gardez where the rise in land and real estate prices and proposed township schemes have increased land grabbing and hence conflicts. This is a development which has to be interpreted against the general trend of rapid urbanization and expansion of provincial and district centres. Our research suggests that land conflicts currently are more prevalent in semi-urban areas as they provide better access to services and security and are of economic value to businessmen, leading to rapid increases in land prices.

Existing land-based conflicts in Afghanistan in general, or Paktia in particular, may be less problematic if adequate and efficient conflict resolution mechanisms were present. However, as in many post-conflict contexts, a rise in land-based conflicts goes hand in hand with a lacking ability to deal with them. In Afghanistan, the problem is manifold. First, there are weak, unclear and conflicting land ownership laws leading to competing land ownership documentation. The latter is a product of frequent regime changes, the legacy of war, the competition between state and customary laws, and particular interests of power holders.

In all cases examined in Paktia, conflicting parties claim to have some proof of ownership. The evidence presented takes on different forms: state tax receipts, registrations with courts, presences of graveyards, previous jirga decisions, or proof of earlier state intervention.

In a culture where both formal and informal institutions exist and overlap it is crucial to understand the influence and impact these mechanisms can have on resolving land disputes adequately and fairly. The relation between formal state and informal customary conflict resolution mechanisms, however, currently is precarious at best, due to the fact that both state and tribal actors are often involved in land-based conflict themselves.

In Paktia, where tribal systems have retained some strength, informal systems of conflict resolution such as jirgas are often called upon to solve conflict disputes. The local population usually prefers jirgas because they are considered more efficient in terms of time and costs, and seen as more transparent than a corrupt state system that is frequently entangled in land-based conflicts in Paktia Province. However, jirgas are not free from corruption and the association of jirgas members with conflict parties often hinders a fair resolution.

The Afghan state is facing a complex challenge. In addition to finding innovative ways of combing customary and formal justice mechanisms into an efficient conflict resolution mechanism for land-based conflicts, it needs to address resources scarcity, greedy power holders, and the (re)settlement of various population groups (returnees, IDPs, Kuchi).